When Competition is Good for
the Host: A Potential New Paradigm for Political Science and Economics
Carmi Turchick
Independent Scholar
Author Note
Carmi Turchick, Independent
Scholar.
Correspondence concerning
this article should be addressed to Carmi Turchick, 402 South Star Avenue,
Tucson, Arizona 85719.
Contact:
c_turchick@hotmail.com
Abstract
Competition
for fitness-limiting resources is a primary force of selection in evolution. For
viruses and parasites, a host body is the resource they compete over. For
selfish individuals, groups of altruists are the resource. Recent work
indicates that if there are multiple poorly-related viruses (Chao et al.,
2000), parasites (Johnson & Hoverman, 2012), or selfish (Eldakar, Farrell, &
Wilson, 2008) infecting a host, then the competition between these exacts a
cost which can reduce their effect and/or virulence in the host. In viruses, for
example, it has been shown that such competition can select for lower virulence
(Chao et al., 2000). My conjecture is that similar processes may occur with
sub-groups infecting national "superorganisms" (Hölldobler, &
Wilson 2008). Evidence suggests that the more diverse and numerous political
parties, interest groups, religions, industries, and corporations are in a
nation, the less harm they usually cause the host population and the more
symbiotic they become. A robust national immune system of laws and regulations
may also influence virulence. If my conjecture is correct, it may provide
fertile ground for new insights in Economics, Political Science, and other
fields. I will also suggest ways in which my conjecture may be falsified.
When
Competition is Good for the Host: A Potential New Paradigm for Political
Science and Economics
Discussion
There are many questions in Economics
and Political Science which currently lack broadly agreed upon answers, and
there are few meta-theories which might point to answers and allow for testable
predictions and hypotheses. For example: monopolies, cartels, dictatorships –
why are these harmful? There are laws against monopolies and cartels in many
countries which exist because the harm they caused was abundantly clear. What
causes the “oil/resource curse” (Ross, 2012; Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2009)?
Why is democracy, government “of, by, and for the people,” usually more
beneficial for a nation than communism, the “dictatorship” of the people? We
are often told that more competition will benefit the consumer: is this
true? If true, is it always true, or are there required
conditions? Can biology point us to a general principle that can be useful in
answering the above questions, and in guiding us away from governments and policies that will harm the general
population and towards those that
will usually benefit them? For now, my answer is a highly qualified maybe.
Limitations and
Definitions of Concepts
There are some important conceptual
limitations to cover, as well as some important terms to define, before I proceed.
I am not claiming that there is an actual evolutionary process occurring which
involves the selection of corporations or industries or political groups. These
entities do not replicate, and asserting that any sort of evolution was
involved would require a type of “group selection” which is not theoretically
viable.[1]
I also want to emphasize that it is important to avoid excessive reductionism
which might obscure the many other important cultural, historical, and
geographic factors that affect the health of a nation and its people. Finally,
by using “virulence” outside of biological realms, I mean it in the generalized
sense of “harmful,” since the usual biology definition of causing host
mortality cannot work (and does not work even within biology when examining
infections of superorganisms). I therefore suggest that income inequality,
corruption, and lack of human rights and freedoms may be used as indicators of
virulence, but I am open to others suggesting new indicators in their future
work.
Evolution of
Virulence in Biology
It may seem counter-intuitive to suggest
that there are sometimes benefits to being infected with a greater diversity of
parasites (i.e. “co-infection,” “multiple infection,” or “super-infection” in
biology). It is critical to realize that parasites may still provide some
benefits to the host – that there is a continuous spectrum from parasitic to
mutualistic or symbiotic (Ewald, 1987). The exact balance of benefit to cost
can be hard to determine, however, and the exact nature of the relationship can
vary over time depending on the fitness of the host and other circumstances.
The important question to be posed is: under what conditions do parasites
become more or less virulent?
Studies of virulence and competition in
multiple infections (i.e. hosts infected by varied species) and co-infections (i.e.
hosts infected by varied strains of one species) give mixed results: sometimes
virulence increases, and sometimes it decreases (Schmid-Hempel, 2012). Even
studies with similar parameters have yielded both results: for example, two
studies of multiple infections of humans with malaria showed an increase in
virulence (Satti et al.,
1998; Zwetyenga et al., 1999), while two other studies showed decreased
virulence (Al-Yaman et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1999). While Turner and Chao
found that low relatedness among viruses reduced virulence (Turner & Chao,
1999; Chao et al., 2000), other studies with more included variables found
increased relatedness resulted in lower virulence (Anderson & May, 1982;
Frank, 1992). Johnson and Hoverman conclude that “increases in parasite
richness and antagonism in nature will decrease virulent infections,” yet
emphasize that “the effects of parasite richness...were context dependent” (2012,
p. 8006).
Two more issues limit our ability to
depend on biology for a firm answer to our question:
1) Studies of multiple infections and co-infections
involving social parasites infecting a social host superorganism (which would
roughly correspond to human society, according to our conjecture) do not exist,
nor are there extent models or theories of what the results of such infections
might be.
2) Mode of transmission is an important issue for
the evolution of virulence, and political parties do not engage in transmission
per se, while corporations and
industries may or may not do so. There do not appear to be any useful
comparisons along these lines.
Keeping all of the above in mind, we
still have evidence that evolution from parasitic to symbiotic is not uncommon
in nature and that formerly parasitic species can come to play critical roles
in the survival of the organism. The human body is always host to more cells that
are bacterial than human (Wenner, 2007), and these bacteria – estimated at
between three and five hundred species in the gut alone (Guarner
& Malagelada,
2003) – could not have begun as symbiotic or mutualistic, even if some are now critical
for our digestion, regulation of inflammation, defense against infections, and
other functions (O'Hara & Shanahan, 2006).
At some point, each evolved to have low average virulence and to provide
symbiotic benefits to their host. However, some of these retain the potential
to be virulent: for example, being implicated in multisystem organ failure when
the immune system of their host becomes too weak (Guarner
& Malagelada,
2003).
Host-parasite interactions – or, more
exactly, host immune system-parasite interactions – are the other major
influence on the evolution of virulence. In general, strong host immune
responses encourage the evolution of lower virulence, while weak immune
responses encourage very high virulence. For example, differences between hosts
were found to be the critical factor in determining which co-infecting malaria
strain prevailed in mice (de Roode et al., 2004). Multiple infections can also
allow normally avirulent parasites to become virulent if the other parasite(s)
compromise the host immune system (Hughes & Boomsma, 2004).
There is then a constant evolutionary
battle being waged where hosts seek to defend themselves, symbiotic organisms
attempt to help, and infecting parasites evolve to best increase their fitness.
Parasites seek to cope with other infecting parasites either by direct
competition for host resources, cooperation to mutually exploit the host, or by
using effects the other parasite has on the host to their own benefit. Relative
strengths of the host, their allies, and all of the infecting parasites appears
to often determine whether the result is higher or lower virulence; a strong
immune system and well-matched multiple infecting agents and/or co-infections
should usually result in lower virulence. Power imbalances in favor of one
parasite should reliably select for increased virulence.
Finally, while it does not directly
relate to virulence, it is perhaps valuable to note that there are common
strategies which parasites use – particularly, but not only, in the social
insects. Among these strategies is circumvention of the host's ability to
recognize the parasite as not being part of the host. According to Nash and
Boomsma (2008), “the majority of long-term social parasites gain access to
colony resources by exploiting the signals used by the social insects
themselves” (p. 57). (This brings to mind a certain tendency to wave flags and
loudly proclaim love of country and constitution.) Other social parasites
engage in appeasement signals, even giving a small reward to the hosts; another
strategy is to use what are called “propaganda signals” – for example,
releasing pheromones that cause the host to panic, or to think that some of
their own are hostile invaders (Nash & Boomsma, 2008). These strategies
also likely sound quite familiar to those who study Political Science.
Selfish Punishment
and Competition
Until quite recently, the study of the
evolution of altruism was missing a critical insight about selfish: that they
are selfish. They do not want to share the exploitation of altruists with other
selfish; altruists are a fitness-limiting resource for selfish, in evolutionary
terms. What this means is that selfish compete with other selfish by engaging
in “selfish punishment” of other selfish. In 2006, Eldakar, Wilson, and
O'Gorman published an interesting paper showing that those most likely to
punish cheaters in their experiment were also the most likely to cheat
themselves. This pattern was then found to exist in various societies, and to
not be culturally specific (Herrmann et al., 2008).
As Eldakar details in a more recent
paper (Eldakar et al., 2013), this pattern can also be found in widely diverse
species and contexts: from dominant primates who reap benefits by paying the
cost of maintaining social order, to wasps who police worker-laid eggs while
laying their own, to Scrub Jays who steal from food caches they defend from
others, and even to pre-school children who control resources by manipulating
their peers. Eldakar (2013) states: “However, when punishment takes the form of
cheaters targeting other cheaters, this competition among cheaters transforms
selfishness to a self-limiting strategy, fostering an increase in altruism in
the population” (p. 1550).
This appears to be essentially the same
process that we see in parasites competing with each other: the competition can
benefit the host and reduce virulence. However, I believe we do need to
distinguish between the mutualism of dominant primates, who gain for themselves
by paying the cost of maintaining social order and thus providing a direct benefit
for the group, and those who benefit the group simply by limiting their own
competition. The group of primates needs to have social order kept, fights
broken up, and so on, just as our stomachs need help digesting food and our
nations need governments to maintain public roads, regulate commerce, enforce
laws and defend the superorganism from outside attacks. Government may be
parasitic, but it is a necessary parasite.
Parasites and
Political Science
It is common for those on both ends of
the political spectrum to assert that government is a parasite, and that it therefore
should be shrunken considerably or entirely done away with. Corporate groups
state that the regulations of the government harm their ability to thrive. If
we were to analyze the role of government in the national superorganism, would
it be virulently parasitic, mutualistic, or symbiotic? Are government
regulations the tapeworm parasite eating our nourishment, or the symbiotic gut flora
helping us to digest while protecting us from E. coli? Are government regulations the acquired immune response of
the national superorganism to previous infections, or a parasite attacking our
friendly symbiotic corporations? The answers to these questions appear to
depend on your form of government and your economic diversity.
Kotera, Okada, and Samreth show that
increased governmental regulation correlates with a decrease in corruption, as
long as the government is sufficiently democratic in nature. They also show
that increased governmental regulation correlates with an increase in corruption, if the government is not sufficiently democratic (Kotera et al., 2012). Graeff and
Mehlkop come to a similar conclusion, finding (to their apparent surprise) that,
in rich countries, “bigger government results in lower levels of corruption” (2002,
p. 611). This was not true in poor countries. Of course, democracy and national
wealth are highly correlated, as we examine below, so these two studies are
effectively in agreement. However, Alexander Hamilton claims that the ratio of
elected to non-elected officials is determinative of corruption, and that the
number of non-elected increases faster than elected with more regulation – resulting
in increased corruption or “rent-seeking” in democracies with more regulation
(Hamilton, 2013). One must keep in mind, though, that Hamilton is writing for The
World Bank, which supports an explicit anti-regulation agenda.
Which view is right? Perhaps a concise
summation of the history of the relationship between government and the
governed from the signing of the Magna Carta to the present will be helpful:
There once
was a time in history when the limitation of governmental power meant
increasing liberty for the people. In the present day the limitation of governmental
power, of governmental action, means the enslavement of the people by the great
corporations, who can only be held in check through the extension of governmental
power. (Roosevelt,
1912)
Stephen Pinker offers a more thorough detailing of
the steadily reduced brutality and harm done by government in his book The
Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (2011). While Pinker
attributes the decline to the rise of humanism and new philosophical insights
into compassion and justice, it seems foolish to ignore the real changes in the
structure of society and distribution of power that were also taking place. It
was the fact that the Barons held London by force that compelled King John to
sign the Magna Carta. It was the later rise of the merchant class that created
the power base to push for further limitations on government, engendering
competition with the nobility and kings with the result of decreased governmental
virulence. The strong correlation between nations deemed “full democracies” by
The Economist in their Democracy Index (2012) and nations with diverse, well-developed
economies is readily apparent: 20 of the 25 full democracies are industrially-developed
Western nations (counting Japan and South Korea). Only three developed Western
nations are put into the “flawed democracy” category: France, Israel, and
Greece. It is my conjecture that this is no accident: that, instead, it is at
least partially the product of the process whereby the merchant and then
corporate parasites competed with the governmental parasite and reduced its
virulence.
Unlimited monarchies often abused their
nations with ruinous taxes, tortured and killed citizens for petty crimes or
for expressing thoughts not approved by the King or official religion, seized
property that they wanted for themselves or for their friends, engaged in
rampant corruption, and had extreme income inequality. The same general pattern
holds for dictatorships today: virulence is high when one parasite has a
monopoly on power.
While unlimited monarchies and
dictatorships have few defenders or proponents in modern Political Science, the
same is not true of fascism, communism, anarchy, neo-liberalism, and libertarianism.
All of these propose to either unite the governmental and corporate parasites; to
eliminate one parasite, the other, or both; or to greatly limit the ability of
one to compete with the other. If my conjecture is correct, and evidence so far
on these types of governments or policies seems to strongly support it, all of
these forms of government will reliably increase virulence in our parasites
because they reduce or eliminate competition between them. Anarchy, the
theoretical final state of communism (wherein the state “withers away”), neo-liberalism,
and libertarianism all propose to compromise or disable the laws and regulations
(i.e. the adapted immune system) of the national superorganism. A weakened or
disabled immune system always leads to higher virulence in infected organisms.
Relevant deregulations preceded the
Savings and Loan crisis, the housing bubble crash/Wall Street disaster, the BP
disaster in the Gulf, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, West Virginia's Sago
mine disaster, the California brown-outs and the accompanying Enron debacle,
the Lac-Megantic train disaster, and the NECC drug compounding company that
caused the deaths of 44 people: weakening a national immune system also seems
to frequently lead to increased virulence.
Our conjecture further suggests that
competition within government and for political power, in the form of competing
political parties, will also reliably reduce virulence. It seems to be no
accident that the separation of powers has been so beneficial, and was copied
or emulated by many other nations.
However, it is predicted that where political parties become too similar
to each other, or when all large political parties become closely aligned with
corporate interests, virulence will increase in the form of higher inequality
and corruption.
Monopolies,
Cartels, the Oil Curse: Virulent Economics
If
competition is the source of lower virulence in corporations, then we should
expect that a lack of competition or large competitive imbalances of power (as
exists in monopolies, cartels, and situations where one very profitable
resource can be readily controlled) will increase virulence. We should also
predict that, for example, large trans-national corporations operating in small
impoverished nations, or corporate giants like Wal-Mart moving into areas with
only small local businesses, will usually have high levels of virulence.
The
creation of the anti-monopoly and anti-cartel antitrust laws in America
reflected the broad agreement that monopolies and cartels were harmful to
competition and the consumer. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which only one
senator opposed, passed with the intention of “protect[ing] the consumers by
preventing arrangements designed, or which tend, to advance the cost of goods
to the consumer" (Senator
John Sherman, qtd. in Lowitt, 2013).
The passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914
gave America greater means to combat the robber barons, and New Deal fair-trade
laws and legislation like the Packers and Stockyards Act further broke the
power of outsized corporations and fostered healthy competition (Lynn, 2012).
As Lynn notes: “In the 1920s, the five largest beef packers controlled upward
of 70 percent of the U.S. market; by 1975, that figure had dropped to
roughly 25 percent”
(2012, p. 31). However, the Reagan Revolution reversed this trend by giving up on
efforts to promote competition. The reversal was rapid, as evidenced by this
quote from 2001: “Today the top four—IBP, ConAgra, Excel (a subsidiary of
Cargill), and National Beef—control about 85 percent of the market” (Schlosser).
Employee wages dropped in the meatpacking industry from being among the highest
paid industrial jobs in 1970 to one of the lowest by 2000 (Schlosser, 2001).
Lynn details the very real harm caused to citizens in many industries, from
poultry farming to computer programming, where similar concentrations of power
have been allowed to arise since 1981 (Lynn, 2012). An imbalance of economic
power appears to encourage virulence.
Similarly, John Madeley’s book Big Business, Poor People: How Transnational Corporations Damage the
World’s Poor details many specific harms caused by the power imbalance
between trans-national corporations and poor, economically undeveloped nations,
succinctly stating that they “can be highly detrimental to a poorer country’s
political, economic, and social health” (Madeley, 2008, p. 17). Again, we see
high virulence for the national superorganism in the absence of balanced
competition.
Ironically,
some alternatives to exploitation by large trans-national corporations may be
worse in some ways if there is, for example, oil, or another highly profitable,
readily monopolized, and government-controlled resource in an economically
undeveloped nation. This is the oil or resource curse. The sudden influx of
wealth to the government of an impoverished and most often undemocratic nation
encourages a large increase in government, as those in charge engage in
patronage and hire friends and relatives (Robinson et al., 2006). As we saw
above, increased regulation in non-democratic nations correlated with increased
corruption (Kotera et al., 2012). Emerson (2006) suggests that corruption and
competition are negatively correlated, and that corruption therefore negatively
affects economic development (unsurprisingly). If our conjecture is correct,
the above simply details the process of increasing virulence when the
government gains considerable economic power alongside its normal powers. As
for Wal-Mart: while their prices are beneficially low, the presence of a
Wal-Mart in a county does increase the poverty rate in the county over time
(Goetz & Swaminathan, 2006). It should be noted, however, that there are
those who defend monopolies and assert that they are “necessarily evolutionary,
dynamic, creative processes,” and furthermore that “without some monopoly
presence no economy can ever hope to maximize human welfare improvement over
time” (Mckenzie & Lee, 2008, p. xvii).
Even in the case of Wal-Mart, some claim that the consumer benefits from the
competition that supercenters bring to local communities, forcing other stores
to lower their prices, and that the lower prices Wal-Mart offers are a benefit
for low-income households (Hausman & Liebtag, 2007).
Conclusions
While we
do seem to find evidence of a similar pattern in many systems – from the
evolution of virulence in bacteria, to the self-limiting process in human
selfishness, to national political and economic systems – we also have evidence
at every level (or at least expert claims) contradicting our conjecture. If
monopolies indeed are beneficial, then our conjecture fails, as it may when the
burgeoning field of parasitology reaches greater levels of understanding about
the evolution of virulence. If it is shown that corruption is not related to
power imbalances and a dearth of competition, our conjecture fails. If it is
shown that deregulation as a broad policy always benefits the nation, then our
related conjecture that laws and regulations are equivalent to the immune
system of the nation also fails.
However,
if scholars working in many fields use my conjecture and find it supported by
the evidence, it may over time become a hypothesis in which we can have some
confidence. This may then allow us to dismiss some proposed political systems
as being inherently faulty – and, more importantly, it may allow us to optimize
our capitalist democracies so that both corporations and government have the
lowest possible virulence and provide the greatest possible mutual benefit to
us, their host.
[1] With
the exception of cultural evolution, which we will leave for others who may
wish to consider its role here.
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